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Recent developments in the law have made the assess-ment of risk of violence a required professional abil-ity for every clinical psychologist. About 30 years 
ago, laws controlling involuntary civil commitment evolved 
to require more than merely a finding of mental illness. They 
also required evidence that patients, if not committed, would 
be dangerous to themselves or to others. During that era, states 
also developed laws that made it mandatory for clinicians to 
report evidence if their child clients, the children of their adult 
clients, and disabled or older adults were in danger of abuse 
by their caretakers.
Clinicians’ obligations to assess risk of violence were 
driven home perhaps most dramatically by the infamous 
“Tarasoff case” (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cal-
ifornia, 1976). Together with subsequent cases across the 
states, Tarasoff required that clinicians take measures to pro-
tect third parties from their clients’ potential for violence. This 
implied that clinicians should take reasonable steps to assess 
and be aware of their clients’ potential for violence. Indeed, 
by 1978, Shah was able to describe no less than 15 legal and 
clinical contexts in which mental health professionals were 
expected to assess the risk of violence and would be poten-
tially liable for failing to do so.
Spurred by these new laws, many researchers in the 1970s 
began to explore mental health professionals’ abilities to as-
sess violence risk. What they found was in stark contrast to 
society’s apparent faith in clinicians’ assessment skills. Sum-
marizing those early studies, Monahan (1981) concluded that 
when clinicians predicted that a person would be violent, 
available research indicated that they were accurate no more 
than one in three times.
Three things could have happened in the ensuing decade of 
the 1980s as a result of this discouraging news: Courts could 
have discontinued their reliance on clinicians’ judgments about 
patients’ potential for violence; clinicians could have heeded 
the news by avoiding roles requiring violence predictions; or 
researchers could have given up on the empirical questions of 
violence predictions. None of these things happened.
As for the courts, judgments about potential violence were 
too much a part of legal standards to relinquish the assistance 
of the clinician. Nowhere was the extent of this need more 
clearly expressed than in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983), which addressed the reliability 
and admissibility of dangerousness prediction by clinicians 
in a capital sentencing case. The court reasoned that the need 
to assess future violence was inevitable. Someone ultimately 
must make the prediction (e.g., judges and juries), and what-
ever guidance clinicians could give them was important. So 
critical was this need that the court was willing to accept clini-
cians’ violence predictions on almost any terms. After all, the 
court explained, mental health professionals’ predictions were 
“not always wrong … only most of the time” (p. 901).
Clinicians themselves continued to offer their assessments 
of risk of violence, but with varying degrees of certainty. 
Heeding the warnings manifested by research, many of them 
offered “best estimates” about patients’ potential for violent 
behavior while being careful to inform the courts of the limits 
of their accuracy. Some were less cautious. But few believed 
that they had nothing to offer the courts.
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Subsequent research has begun to show that these clini-
cians may have been right (see, e.g., Lidz, Mulvey, & Gard-
ner, 1993). A “second generation” of violence risk studies dur-
ing the 1980s and the present decade (Otto, 1992) has given 
rise to a new outlook. Ten years after his earlier conclusion, 
Monahan’s (1992) review of the new violence risk stud-
ies spoke much more optimistically about a growing scien-
tific base of information on violence risk predictors (Hodgins, 
1993; Monahan & Steadman, 1994), with the promise of sig-
nificant breakthroughs by research in progress (Steadman et 
al., 1994). When properly translated, the results of the new 
generation of violence risk studies might soon provide mental 
health professionals with a more reliable scientific foundation 
for describing a person’s violence risk, thereby assisting soci-
ety in deciding when those risks are sufficient to take action to 
protect the person and others.
We have not yet achieved this capacity. Yet the time is near 
enough that researchers and policy analysts in this field have 
begun to address questions beyond the potential accuracy of 
violence prediction. Many of these questions pertain to the de-
velopment of technology that will translate research results so 
that they can guide clinicians when applying them to individ-
ual cases (e.g., Rice & Harris, 1995; Webster, Harris, Rice, 
Cormier, & Quinsey, 1994). What tools would facilitate cli-
nicians’ use of new knowledge in the prediction of violent be-
havior? How can we best communicate our violence risk esti-
mates in the courts? How do we ensure that new knowledge 
and methods will be incorporated into the clinical practice of 
risk assessment?
These are the questions addressed by the three articles in 
this special section. In the first article, Monahan and Stead-
man (1996) explore how best to convey violence risk esti-
mates so that they can be understood and translated for deci-
sions by courts, mental health service systems, and society in 
general. Their proposal likens the task of violence risk assess-
ment to weather forecasting, especially when meteorologists 
seek to predict the “rare and severe event” that threatens dam-
age to property and people.
Can the long experience, advanced technology, and practi-
cal orientation of meteorology provide us with a heuristic for 
anticipating how we can best communicate violence risk pre-
dictions, especially in legal settings? Monahan and Steadman 
(1996) propose that it can and that it should lead us to consider 
clinical and research alternatives to approaches that currently 
predominate. For example, current practice leads clinicians to 
think in terms of probabilities when considering estimates of 
the likelihood of future violence (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1992). 
Whatever value this may have for framing one’s logical pro-
cessing of clinical information, is it necessarily the best way 
to communicate it to others? Should we consider categorical 
risk communications, as meteorology has done, rather than 
messages containing statements of absolute probability?
One of the features of weather communications, as de-
scribed by Monahan and Steadman (1996), is to include in-
structions to the listener about how to respond to the danger 
represented by a category of severity of the predicted weather 
conditions. In this approach, the prediction and the way it is 
communicated are more than a message about the odds of an 
event. The likelihood and the severity of the event are trans-
lated into a prescriptive statement about the action that the lis-
tener should take.
This presents a conceptual, practical, and ethical problem 
that is explored by Schopp (1996) in the second article in this 
collection. His concern arises from a fundamental difference 
between the social prescriptions that are relevant for respond-
ing to severe weather and those that are relevant for respond-
ing to serious threats of human violence. In the former, we are 
concerned about getting out of the way. In the latter, however, 
our social response is more likely to involve incapacitation or 
other legal intrusions that will directly affect the liberty of the 
person whom we are warned to fear.
The greater moral nature of the latter type of actions raises 
questions about psychologists’ role in offering their predic-
tions. What are the proper limits of psychological expertise, 
in light of the prescriptive and moral nature of the outcomes 
of their predictions? Does the weather-forecasting analogy—
with its prescriptions for action—provide adequate guidance 
when applied to violence forecasting? Or does it lead us into 
moral territory beyond the scientific expertise of psychology?
In coming years, when we have improved our capacities to 
predict future violence and have found proper ways to com-
municate those predictions, we will need to take further steps 
to deal with our newfound knowledge. Clinicians must then 
be enabled to use those advances and taught to use whatever 
is known about their effective communication. This is the fo-
cus of the third article by Borum (1996), a forensic clinical 
psychologist. He emphasizes that experimental variables that 
have predictive power in research must be translated into us-
able risk assessment technology. We will need to develop 
tools and techniques to meet the practical demands of clini-
cians and to guide their use of the new knowledge so that it 
clearly conveys relevant information to legal decision mak-
ers. Borum also explores how we can best teach and dissem-
inate new knowledge and technology in risk assessment, so 
that their diffusion will contribute to standards and guidelines 
for clinical practice.
These three articles, therefore, are about the future. We are 
only now beginning to see the fruits of more than 25 years of 
research aimed at improving our capacities to make reliable 
and valid estimates of violence risk. With this knowledge will 
come increased obligations to use it effectively and responsi-
bly. It is important that we begin to think through how we can 
best do that, before the time is suddenly on us. The articles in 
this Current Issues section identify part of the agenda for that 
process.
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